View Facade Cross-Contract Call Safety

Last updated: 16 August 2026

Archived — describes a contract that does not exist

This page is in the archive: it documents a Soroban contract surface with no implementation in any Grainlify repository, verified 16 August 2026. Kept as a design record, not as a description of working software.

Overview

This document is the security audit for cross-contract call safety in contracts/escrow-view-facade/ and contracts/view-facade/ (issue #1288).

Both facades act as read-only aggregation layers. They must never:

• Call auth-gated (state-mutating) functions on underlying contracts
• Forward or escalate caller auth to underlying contracts
• Modify state in any contract other than their own registry

---

Audit: escrow-view-facade

Cross-contract calls made

Function called on underlying	Type	Auth required?	State mutated?
try_get_escrow_info(id)	view	❌ No	❌ No
try_get_metadata(id)	view	❌ No	❌ No
try_get_pause_flags()	view	❌ No	❌ No
try_query_escrows_by_depositor(user, offset, limit)	view	❌ No	❌ No

All calls use the try_ prefix — they return Result instead of panicking, so a missing or erroring underlying contract causes graceful degradation (None / empty vec) rather than a trap.

Auth forwarding analysis

The facade does not call require_auth() on behalf of the caller at any point. The facade's own entrypoints (get_escrow_summary, get_escrow_summaries, get_user_portfolio) take no caller: Address parameter and perform no auth checks — any address can call them.

State mutation analysis

The facade writes no state to the underlying escrow contract. It only reads from instance storage of the escrow contract via view functions.

The facade itself has no instance storage — it is a pure pass-through.

Security verdict: ✅ SAFE

---

Audit: view-facade

Cross-contract calls made

ViewFacade makes no cross-contract calls. It only reads and writes its own instance storage (DataKey::Admin, DataKey::Registry).

Auth model

Entrypoint	Auth required	Notes
init(admin)	None (first-caller)	Admin stored immutably; double-init rejected
register(addr, kind, ver)	Admin	admin.require_auth() enforced
deregister(addr)	Admin	admin.require_auth() enforced
list_contracts(offset, limit)	None	Pure read
list_contracts_all()	None	Pure read
contract_count()	None	Pure read
get_contract(addr)	None	Pure read
get_admin()	None	Pure read

State mutation analysis

• register and deregister write only to DataKey::Registry in the facade's own instance storage. They do not touch any external contract.
• All view functions are pure reads with no side effects.

Security verdict: ✅ SAFE

---

Security Assumptions

1. Admin key security — the admin address is immutable after init. A compromised admin key can modify the registry but cannot affect underlying escrow contracts.

2. No fund custody — neither facade holds tokens or transfers funds.

3. Bounded registry — ViewFacade enforces MAX_REGISTRY_SIZE = 1000 to prevent storage exhaustion attacks.

4. try_ pattern — EscrowViewFacade uses try_ calls so a malicious or broken underlying contract cannot cause the facade to trap.

5. No auth escalation — calling a view function on either facade does not grant the caller any elevated permissions on the underlying contracts.

---

Test Coverage (issue #1288)

escrow-view-facade/src/test_cross_contract_safety.rs

Test	Property verified
test_get_escrow_summary_is_read_only	No mutating functions called
test_get_escrow_summaries_batch_is_read_only	Batch also read-only
test_get_user_portfolio_is_read_only	Portfolio also read-only
test_unprivileged_caller_can_query_facade	No auth required to query
test_two_different_callers_get_identical_results	No per-caller state
test_facade_does_not_require_caller_auth	No auth check on caller
test_missing_escrow_returns_none	Graceful degradation
test_batch_with_missing_escrows_returns_empty_vec	Graceful degradation
test_user_portfolio_with_missing_contract_returns_empty	Graceful degradation
test_escrow_summary_fields_match_underlying_data	Correct data mapping
test_paused_contract_reflected_in_summary	Pause state read correctly
test_batch_and_single_return_consistent_data	Batch/single consistency
test_empty_batch_returns_empty_vec	Edge case: empty input

view-facade/src/test_cross_contract_safety.rs

Test	Property verified
test_list_contracts_requires_no_auth	View is public
test_get_contract_requires_no_auth	View is public
test_contract_count_requires_no_auth	View is public
test_list_contracts_all_requires_no_auth	View is public
test_get_admin_requires_no_auth	View is public
test_register_requires_admin_auth	Mutation is admin-gated
test_deregister_requires_admin_auth	Mutation is admin-gated
test_view_call_does_not_grant_register_access	No auth escalation
test_double_init_is_rejected	Admin immutability
test_admin_cannot_be_replaced_after_init	Admin immutability
test_registry_state_consistent_across_reads	Registry isolation
test_unprivileged_caller_sees_same_registry_as_admin	No per-caller state
test_paginated_list_requires_no_auth	Pagination is public
test_invalid_pagination_returns_error_not_panic	Graceful error handling
test_registry_full_error_is_returned_not_panic	Bounded storage
test_deregister_nonexistent_is_noop	Idempotent deregister
test_get_contract_returns_none_for_unknown_address	Safe miss handling
test_get_contract_returns_correct_entry_after_register	Correct data